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DIRECT AND INDIRECT ABORTION 
Question: W ill you pl e a s e 
explain the difference between 
.. direct" and .. indirect" abortion? 
Also, plea se explain why the 
former is never allowed, whereas 
the latter is sometimes licit ? 
The questions are timely, as the 
a nswers involve principles that a re 
of frequent application in medico-
moral problems. Moreover, those 
who fail to grasp these principles 
are apt to think that some distinc-
tions made by Catholic moralists 
are mere words, subtleties that 
have no place in deciding issues 
that involve life or death. 
Illustrative Problems 
Our discussion of principles will 
be clearer if we first cite a number 
of sim ple illustrative problems. 
1. A man who knows nothing 
about the effects of strong liquor 
takes a large quantity of whisky, 
with the result that he becomes 
intoxicated and severely injures 
himself and several others. Is he 
responsible befor e God _for the . 
effects of his drinking? 
2. A doctor who has made a ll 
reasonable efforts to di scover 
whether a woman is pregnant, and 
who has concluded that she is not 
pregnant, performs an operation 
which kills a living fetus. Is he 
morally responsible for the death 
of the fetus? 
3. A married woman who has 
tried to prevent conception fail s 
in this immoral effort and becomes 
pregnant. To avoid the burden of 
caring for . children, she takes a 
drug which is supposed to induce 
an abortion. Is she morally justi-
fied in indUcing the abortion? 
4. A pregnant unmarried 
woman wishes to have an abor-
tion in order to protect her good 
na me. Is this permissible? 
5. To check a severe hemor-
rhage in a threatened abortion, the 
doctor wishes to use a tampon. He 
realizes , however, that this may 
bring about the expulsion of the 
inviable fetus . Is he justified in 
resorting to this procedure? 
6. Having frUitlessly tried all 
other means of removing the dis-
astrous effect of hyp e remesis 
gravidarum , the doctor wishes to 
empty the uterus, even though it 
contains a living inviable fetus. Is 
this procedure licit as a last resort? 
7. An operable cancer of the cer-
vix is discovered early in preg -
nancy. May the radical operation 
be performed at that time in order 
to save the life of the mother? 
8. While driving his car at a 
reasonable speed, a man sees a 
pedestrian a short distance ahead 
of him. He puts on his brakes, 
but the brakes fail to hold, and 
the result is that he kills the pedes-
trian. Up to this time there had 
been no reason for suspecting 
faulty brake s . I s the driver 
morally responsible for the death 
of the pedestrian? 
Principle of Imputability 
All the problems just cited deal 
with an action or procedure that 
produces or is likely to produce a 
harmful effect. Concerning such 
problems , the firs t question that 
arises in the mind of the moralist 
is this : when is a person morally 
responsible (that is : responsible 
before God) for such harmful 
effects? To answer th is question , 
Catholic moralists have formulated 
the follOWing principle: 
" A man is responsible for the 
evil effects of his actions, if these 
three conditions a re verified: (1) 
he realizes that the evil effect may 
take place ; (2) he is able to avoid 
the action that produces the evil 
effect; and (3) he is conscious of 
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an obligation to refrain from plac~ 
ing the action lest this effect fol-
low. If anyone of these conditions 
is not verified, a man is not guilty 
before God for causing the evil 
effect. " 
The first of the conditions is 
surely the plainest kind of com-
mon sense, and it explains why the 
man in problem 1 cannot be said 
to be morally gUilty of drunken-
ness or morally responsible for the 
harm done while intoxicated . For 
in taking the whisky he did not 
even suspect its power. And the 
same is to be said of the doctor 
in problem 2. When he operated 
he was reasonably certain that the 
, woman was not pregnant; the 
death of the fetus was merely an 
unfortunate accident, as far as he 
was concerned. 
The second condition is also 
common sense; and it surely re~ 
quires no proof for one who un-
derstands the meaning of moral 
responsibility . For the very basis 
of human responsibility is freedom; 
and one who cannot avoid a harm-
ful action is not free . I do not 
know whether this condition can 
be aptly illustrated by any type of 
medical or surgical case; but prob~ 
lem 8 seems to be a clear example 
of inability to stop the harm-pro-
ducing action . A driver with use-
less brakes is a very ' helpless per-
son in a crisis . 
The moralists' headache comes 
in explaining the third condition. 
Common sense, of course, tells us 
that we are not obliged to abstain 
from all actions that produce harm-
ful results; otherwise life would 
be an almost intolerable burden. 
But common sense will not even 
suggest a practical rule for judg-
ing when such actions must be 
omitted and when they may be 
performed. This practical rule 
must be arrived at by a careful 
analysis of the third condition . The 
analysis can be expressed by the 
following series of questions: 
a) Will the contemplated action 
produce some good effect? If the 
only effect of the action is evil. 
then one who foresees this cannot 
perform the action without at the 
same time willing the evil. For 
example, in problem 3, the only 
effect of the drug is to induce the 
abortion; hence the taking of the 
drug cannot be morally justifiable. 
b) Is the person who places the 
action sincerely seeking the good 
effect, and not the evil effect? None 
of the problems explicitly illus-
trates this point; yet it is an im-
portant one in medico-moral prob-
lems. For example, it might hap-
pen that certain procedures such 
as that mentioned in problem 5 
(" using a tampon to stop hemor-
rhage) could be justifiable; yet 
even in these cases the doctor could 
render his action morally culpable 
by wishing to kill the child. 
c) Is the good effect produced 
by means of the evil effect? Both 
sound reason and divine revelation 
teach us that we must not do evil 
in order to obtain good . This prin-
ciple is violated in problems 4 and 
6, for in both these cases the in-
viable fetus is expelled as a means 
of obtaining the good results. The 
woman's reputation (problem 4) 
is saved only by getting rid of th e 
fetus ; and the vomiting (problem 
6) is stopped only by the empty-
ing of the uterus. On the other 
hand , in problems 5 and 7 we have 
examples of good effects caused by 
the procedures themselves. It is 
the packing, not the abortion , that 
stops the hemorrhage; and it is 
the removal of the cancer, not the 
death of the fetus , that saves the 
mother 's life. 
d) Is the good effect of sufficient 
value to compensate for the harm-
ful effect? The general idea here 
is not difficult to grasp. But the 
actual estimate of relative values 
in concrete cases is often very dif-
ficult. For example , in problem 5 
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the justification for using the tam-
pon and risking an abortion would 
depend on whether some other 
simpler treatment would produce 
the desired result of saving the 
mother. And in problem 7, the 
justification of performing the 
radical operation would depend on 
the possibility of waiting until the 
fetus reaches viability and still sav-
ing the mother. 
Principle of Double Effect 
I have gone to some length in 
explaining and analysing the gen-
eral principle of moral imputability 
for evil effects, because this expla-
nation and analysis contain all the 
raw materials for another, and 
slightly different, principle which 
is often used by moralists, espe-
cially in their solution of medico-
moral problems. I refer to the so-
called " principle of the double 
effect." In formulating this partic-
ular principle, the moralists put in 
capsule form all the points that I 
explained in my analysis of the 
third condition referred to in the 
principle of imputability. In brief 
form, the prinCiple of the double 
effect may be stated as follows : 
.. It is licit to perform an ac tion 
which has good and ba d effects 
provided: (a) that the action it-
self is not morally bad ; (b) that 
the evil effect is Sincerely not de-
sired, but merely tolerated ; (c) 
that the evil is not the means of 
obtaining the good effect; and (d) 
that the good effect is sufficiently 
important to balance or outweigh 
the harmful effect." . 
I might add here that, though it 
is often necessary to test the licit-
ness of medical and surgical pro-
cedures by applying the principle 
of the double effect, this is not 
always the case. For example, in 
ordinary mutilations such as the 
removal of the appendix or gall 
bladder or the amputation of an 
infected limb. there is no need of 
resorting to this principle; for these 
organs have a natural subordina-
tion to the entire body, and man 
has a na tural right to mutilate or 
remove them when this is neces-
sary for the good of the whole 
body. In such cases, therefore , the 
principle that evil may not be done 
in order to obtain some good result 
does not apply. The evil may be 
desired and caused in order to ob-
tain some proportiona te benefit for 
the whole body. 
But when there is question of 
procedures w hich cause evil effects 
that are outside the scope of man 's 
direct rights, the principle of the 
double effect must be applied. For 
example, the generative function , 
as such. is a social function and 
is not directly subordinated to the 
good of the individual; hence pro-
cedures that induce sterility must 
be tested by the principle of the 
double effect. 
Similarly, the principle of the 
double effect must be applied to all 
procedures that are designed to 
benefit the mother but which also 
involve the danger of abortion or 
of some other harm to the child; 
for the life and well-being of the 
child are not subordinated to the 
life a nd well-being of the mother. 
This point brings us to the ques-
tions asked at the beginning of our 
discussion. 
Direct and Indirect Abortion 
By abortion I mean the inter-
ruption of a pregnancy before the 
fetu s is viable. The supposition is 
tha t the fetus is still alive and 
that the placenta is still attached 
to the mother. To expel a dead 
fetus is not an abortion ; nor is it 
an abortion to remove from the 
uterus a fetus which is already 
completely detached from the 
mother. 
An abortion is said to be direct 
when the interruption of the preg-
nancy is intended either as an end 
in itself (as in problem 3) or as 
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a means to some other end (as in 
problems 4 and 6) . In such cases 
the procedure is precisely directed 
to the interruption of the preg~ 
nancy; hence the life of the fetus 
is directly attacked. Such pro-
cedures, even when euphemistically 
labeled "therapeutic," are never 
licit. Note the following strong 
words of Pius XI on this point : 
"As to the 'medical and thera ~ 
peutic indication ' to which , using 
their own words , We have made 
reference, Venerable Brethren , 
however much We may pity the 
mother whose health and even life 
is gravely imperiled in the per~ 
formance of the duty allotted to 
her by nature , nevertheless what 
could ever be a sufficient reason 
for excusing in any way the direct 
murder of the innocent? This is 
precisely what we are dealing with 
here. Whether inflicted upon the 
mother or upon the child it is 
against the precept of God and 
the law of nature : 'Thou shalt 
not kill.' The life of each is equally 
sacred, and no one has the power, 
not even the public authority, to 
destroy it." 
An abortion is said to be indirect 
when the interruption of the preg~ 
nancy is the undesired but un~ 
avoidable effect of a procedure 
which is immediately directed to 
some other good purpose (e.g. the 
stopping of hemorrhage, as in 
problem 5, or the removal of can-
cer, as in problem 7) . Granted 
that an abortion is merely indirect , 
it may be permitted for a suffi~ 
ciently serious reason (e.g . when 
the procedure is really necessary 
to save the life of the mother), 
beca use in this case all the condi~ 
tions of the principle of th e double 
effect are applicable. 
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